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The Clyde Tunnel in Glasgow, Scotland, is currently undergoing refurbishment. This refurbishment 
includes the installation of a new tunnel lining / fire protection system in both tunnel tubes. This lining 
system has already been shown to protect the tunnel structure from high temperatures However, there 
is a gap at the lower edge of the lining to allow any water accumulated behind the lining to run into a 
drainage channel within the main tunnel void. There were concerns that this small gap might lead to 
the exposure of the structural members to very high temperatures in the event of a fire in the tunnel. 
A heat transfer analysis was carried out. This analysis consisted of the evaluation of the 
thermal field inside the tunnel using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) computations. This 
identified the locations in the tunnel which were most likely to be at risk, and predicted the conditions 
at those locations in the event of a ‘worst case’ fire scenario. On the basis of this information a 
bounding heat transfer analysis was carried out that allowed the establishment of the temperature 
evolution of the structural elements. CFD tools were not used for the heat transfer analysis because the 
complexity of the geometry made the uncertainty too large to justify a detailed CFD study. Instead, 
this bounding analysis allowed the establishment of the maximum possible temperatures of the 
structural elements.  
It was found that, even in a ‘worst case’ scenario fire, the temperature of the structural 
elements would not exceed critical levels for several hours of maximum fire exposure. The design of 




(a) The Clyde Tunnel 
 
      
 
Figure 1 – Photographs of the tunnel during construction and the original tunnel lining. 
 
The construction of the second† road tunnel under the river Clyde was started in 1957 and the 
northbound tube was opened by Queen Elizabeth II in 1963. The southbound tube opened the 
following year. The tunnels are 762m long, are constructed out of iron sections and, when they 
                                                 
† The first tunnel under the Clyde, the ‘Harbour Tunnel’, was built in the 1890s. It was accessed by hydraulic 
lifts in the two ‘rotundas’ (which can still be seen on the banks of the Clyde). The tunnel was closed to vehicles 
in 1943 and the lifts were removed. It was closed to pedestrians in 1986 and filled-in in 1987. 
opened, were the steepest road tunnels in the world with a 6% slope (1:16). In 1957, the expected 
traffic density was 9,000 vehicles per day; in 1965 22,000 vehicles used the tunnel on a daily basis; 
today the daily traffic flow is over 65,000 vehicles. The original ventilation system was fully 
transverse, with air supplied through vents along the kerbside and periodic extraction vents along the 
ceiling, see Figure 1. 
 
(b) The refurbishment 
 
    
 
Figure 2 – Photographs of the tunnel during refurbishment and the application of the fire protection. 
 
The £9M refurbishment of the Clyde Tunnel includes the installation of a new tunnel lining / fire 
protection system in both tunnel tubes, an overhaul of the ventilation system and the installation of a 
state of the art video monitoring system.  
 
The primary requirement of the new lining system is that it should protect the iron sections of the 
tunnel structure in the event of a fire. The lining system consists of a steel framework attached to the 
iron sections, this is covered by steel sheeting and a wire mesh, to which a 40mm layer of cementitious 
fire protection is applied, by spraying in-situ, see Figure 2. This lining system has been furnace tested 
in the laboratory and has been shown to adequately protect the structural members from temperatures 
up to 1350°C for over two hours, according to the standard time-temperature curve proposed by 
Rijkwaterstaat, the Netherlands (hereafter referred to as the RWS curve) [1]. 
 








Figure 3 – Simplified representation of the tunnel cross-section showing the lining system and the 
drainage channel. 
 
One of the secondary functions of the lining system is to act as a drip shield, such that all leakage into 
the tunnel runs down the outer side of the lining system and drains into a channel in the main tunnel 
void‡. In order to allow the water to pass from the cavity into the tunnel void, there has to be a gap 
between the lower edge of the lining system and the concrete which forms the drainage channel and 
protects the lower parts of the tunnel structure, see Figure 3. There was some concern that this gap 
might allow the structural members of the tunnel to be exposed to high temperatures in the event of a 
fire in the tunnel. 
 
The University of Edinburgh were contracted to analyse the problem and report on the safety of this 
design. The analysis of the problem was carried out in two stages: 
 
• Various scenarios involving a fire in the tunnel were simulated using a computer fire model, to 
determine the conditions in the vicinity of the gap in the event of a fire, and 
• The heat transfer to the tunnel structure was calculated, based on the ‘worst case’ values 




Due to the design of the gap and the drainage channel, there is no direct line-of-sight path for heat 
transfer from the void into the cavity by radiation, so it is assumed that any heat transfer into the cavity 
will be due to a pressure driven flow of hot gas. Thus the objective of the computer simulations was to 
identify those parts of the tunnel, near the gap, which exhibited the highest pressures. The rate of gas 
flow into the cavity could then be estimated if the pressure in the cavity is assumed to remain at 
ambient; this is deemed to be an extreme ‘worst case’ assumption as, in reality, the pressure would 
most likely be above ambient initially and would increase to be equal to the void pressure (thus 
eliminating the flow) within a matter of moments. 
 
It was also assumed that the gas flow into the cavity would only transfer heat to the iron sections of the 
tunnel and not to the back of the lining material; this is another ‘worst case’ assumption. In reality 
there would be heat losses to the rear of the lining material and thus there would be less heat transfer 




The conditions in the tunnel in the event of a fire were modelled using the ‘Fire Dynamics Simulator’ 
(FDS) model (version 4). FDS is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model, developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the USA [2]. This code is of generalized use 
in the Fire safety Engineering community and relevant validation exercises can be found in the 
literature supplied by the developers. 
 
As the requirements of the lining system are those of the RWS fire, the aim of the modelling was to 
simulate fires in the tunnel which would generate peak gas temperatures of about 1350°C and then 
predict the peak temperatures and pressures in the vicinity of the gap. The growth and decay phases of 
the fires were not of direct relevance to the study, so the simulations carried out considered high heat 
release rate (HRR) fires with a constant output, so that the simulations would approximate to ‘steady-
state’ conditions. This scenario is actually more severe than the RWS fire as the standard fire only 
remains at a peak temperature for a limited time. 
 
All computer models have limitations and in the case of FDS they pertain mostly to the combustion 
model and radiation heat transfer associated to fire growth. As this study did not require the prediction 
of the fire burning behaviour (the fires were prescribed) or radiation, most of the limitations of FDS 
could be ignored.  
 
                                                 
‡ Throughout this paper the word ‘cavity’ will be used to describe the space between the lining system and the 
tunnel structure, whereas the word ‘void’ will be used to describe the main vehicle space in the tunnel. 
However, the requirement that the simulated environment be constructed out of rectilinear cells cannot 
be overlooked. The upper parts of the Clyde Tunnel cross-section have a semi-circular aspect which 
must be represented by rectangular blocks in the simulated tunnel. This is not a particularly significant 
problem in this instance as the steps do not have a severe influence in the global nature of the flow. 
Temperatures, pressures and flow velocities depend mostly on the global behaviour of the flow, thus 
the ‘step-like’ geometry will provide very similar results to a smoothly curved wall. Also, the parts of 
the tunnel which are of interest are reasonably ‘step-like’ in themselves. 
 
The cross-sectional profile of the simulated environment is shown in Figure 4. The geometry of the 
tunnel has been simplified to being constructed out of 1m3 cubes, thus the kerb, elevated walkway and 
drainage channel have all been represented by a 1m high by 1m wide block at the side of the roadway. 
At eight locations through the tunnel, the fire safety installations have been included, modelled as a 
1m high, 1m wide (as viewed in cross-section) and 2m deep box. The gas temperature and pressure 
have been recorded at various locations in the tunnel at the apex of the ceiling, beside the gap and just 










Figure 4 – Typical cross-sectional profile of the simulated tunnel (with safety box) 
 
The longitudinal profile of the simulated tunnel was based on the plans of the east tube, which has a 
slope of approximately 1:17 on the northern side and a slope of approximately 1:16 on the southern 
side. The simulated tunnel was therefore constructed out of long, 1m high steps, each 17m long on the 
north side and 16m long on the south side. The lowest section of the tunnel (between the first step on 
each side) was 33m long. There were twenty steps on each side. The longitudinal profile of the model 
tunnel is shown in Figure 5. The computational domain extended above and beyond the ends of the 

















If there was a large fuel spillage in the tunnel, for example a fuel tanker shed its load, the fuel would 
flow to the lowest point of the tunnel and form a pool. If this was to catch fire, a serious incident 
would develop. The first simulations carried out involved large fuel pools at the lowest point in the 
tunnel. The initial run was carried out prescribing a fuel vaporisation rate equivalent to a HRR of  
220MW and assuming natural ventilation conditions. In this instance the HRR calculated by the model 
was substantially lower than the prescribed value as there was insufficient oxygen to allow burning at 
this level. As a consequence of this, the peak temperatures in the tunnel were only of the order of 
600°C and nowhere near the required level. Several subsequent runs were attempted, varying the 
prescribed HRR and the ventilation, but none of these scenarios attained the peak temperatures 
required due to the (lack of) oxygen supply at the lowest point in the tunnel. 
 
Further simulations were attempted using the scenario of a HGV fire about halfway up the slope on 
the north side of the tunnel. In this scenario, it was expected that all the smoke, hot gases and 
combustion products would flow up the tunnel to the north, due to buoyancy effects, while fresh air 
would be drawn in from the south in sufficient quantities to elevate the HRR of the fire and the 
temperatures in the tunnel to the values required by the RWS curve. The HGV was modelled as being 
on the 9th step up on the north side. Various HRR values were prescribed over the course of several 
simulations, and the predicted ceiling temperatures only satisfied the RWS curve requirements when 
the HRR was set at 500MW or higher. 
 
It should be noted that heat release rates of the order of 500MW are highly unrealistic for fires in 
tunnels. The highest measured HRR for an experimental fire in a tunnel was just over 200MW. This 
was for a mock up of a HGV trailer in a nearly horizontal tunnel, loaded with nearly 11 tonnes of 
wooden and plastic pallets, subject to a forced longitudinal airflow [3]. Even multiple vehicle fires in 
tunnels have not been estimated to have exhibited HRRs of this scale. In the Channel Tunnel fire of 
November 1996, the fire involved ten HGVs and their carrier wagons, and the peak HRR of that fire 
has been estimated to have been about 350MW [4]. Very high temperatures, as simulated by the RWS 
curve, are only expected to be produced during fires in tunnels which are close to horizontal. In 
tunnels with significant gradients, such as the Clyde Tunnel, the smoke and hot gases produced by a 
fire will be transported away much more rapidly, due to buoyancy effects. This will tend to lead to 
smaller temperatures in the tunnel. In the event of a fire in the Clyde Tunnel, it is highly unlikely that 
the temperatures in the tunnel would be as high as those simulated by the RWS curve. Thus is has 
been necessary to use an unrealistically high prescribed HRR to simulate the temperature conditions 
required by the RWS standard. Therefore, the modelled scenario has to be considered as an “extreme 
worst case” condition. 
 
The results of the 500MW HGV fire simulation are presented in the figures that follow. Figure 6 
shows representations of the temperature, velocity and pressure profiles on the centreline of the tunnel 




Figure 6 – ‘Steady state’ conditions for a 500MW HGV fire on the north slope of the Clyde Tunnel, 
eastern tube. 
  
The steady state temperature and pressure recorded at the virtual thermocouples at the ceiling and the 
gap are shown in Figures 7-10. In each graph, the data are presented versus distance along the tunnel; 





















Figure 7 – ‘Steady state’ ceiling temperature 
































Figure 8 – ‘Steady state’ ceiling pressure 
versus distance along the tunnel. 























































Figure 10 – Average ‘steady state’ pressure at 
the gap . 
 
It is clear from Figure 10 that the pressure conditions near the gap were generally found to be at 
approximately ambient pressure, that is, at most gap locations there would be no pressure-driven flow 
of hot gas into the cavity in the event of a fire, as the pressure difference between the cavity and the 
void would be insignificant. 
 
The only significant variation from this trend is above the safety box in the first fire point recess 
(nearest the portal), where the pressure reached a value of about 50 Pa above ambient pressure, see 
Figure 11. Thus it is necessary to calculate what the effect of the flow of hot gas (at about 510°C, see 
































Figure 11 – The pressure profile recorded 





















Figure 12 – The temperature profile recorded 
above the first safety box. 
 
Flow of hot gas into the cavity 
 
Calculations have been made for the case of a flow of hot gas (assumed to be hot air) at 510°C into the 
cavity, which is assumed to remain at ambient pressure. In reality, the pressure in the cavity would 
most likely be much closer to the pressure in the tunnel void, so the flow would be expected to be 
smaller. Also, due to the volume and geometry of the cavity, it is likely that a pressure balance would 
be reached fairly quickly and so the flow would cease early in the fire development. Thus, these 
calculations are to be taken to represent a ‘worst case’ scenario; in reality the flow, and hence the heat 
transfer to the tunnel structure would be much less significant than calculated here.  
 














-3 in the vicinity of the gap above the 1st safety box. 
 









where Cd is the “coefficient of discharge” which generally has a value of about 0.6 for instances like 










In the scenario considered, the gas jet passes through a narrow gap into the void behind the panel 
which is taken to be about 0.3m wide for the most part. Thus the velocity will be reduced according to 
the ratio of the width of the opening to the width of the gap behind the panel. Thus, if the gap is 50mm 
wide, the velocity will reduce by 50/300 in the void to give 1.5ms
-1, or if the gap is 30mm wide, the 
velocity will reduce by 30/300 in the void to give 0.9ms
-1, and so on. Thus there is a flow of hot gas at 
about 510°C flowing over the iron segments of the tunnel with a velocity of up to 1.5ms-1 (depending 
on the geometry of the gap). In the analysis presented here we will assume the gap is 50mm wide, 
hence the velocity over the tunnel structure is taken to be 1.5ms-1. 
 
Convective heat transfer rates are governed by a number of non-dimensional groups. In order to 
calculate the heat transfer to the iron sections, it is necessary to calculate the Nusselt number of the 
flow. The Nusselt number (Nu) is a function of the Reynolds number (Re) and the Prandtl number (Pr) 
which define the relationship between the inertia and viscosity of a fluid and the relationship between 
the momentum diffusivity and thermal diffusivity of a fluid, respectively. These may be found using 











where L is a characteristic length scale, µ is the dynamic viscosity,  is the thermal diffusivity, υ is the 
kinematic viscosity, cp is the specific heat at constant pressure and k is the thermal conductivity.  
 
Assuming the width of the cavity behind the lining (i.e. 0.3m) to be the characteristic length, the 














and the Prandtl number may be found, directly from a table in a text book [5], to be Pr = 0.7 for air at 

































taking the value of k for air at 500°C from [5] and assuming turbulent flow. Having established h as 
being about 4.7 Wm-2K-1, we need to calculate temperature rise in the iron. For a solid of unit surface 




Vc −= ∞ρ  
 
where V is volume (= 1 × 1 × 0.03), not velocity. cp and  values for iron can be found in a text book 
(= 447 and 7870, respectively, from [5]). If we define the temperature difference between the gas and 
the solid as: 
∞−= TTsθ  
 















m  (approx. constant) 
 






×−== θθ  
 
For example, after two hours of exposure to the heated flow, the temperature rise of the iron is: 
 
°−=×−==





Thus, after two hours, the temperature of the iron is 363° below the hot gas temperature, i.e. 147°C. 
 





















Figure 13 – Calculated temperature rise of unit area of tunnel structural section with time. 
 
It should be noted that the results calculated here and displayed in Figure 13 take no account of heat 
losses from the structural members of the tunnel, either to the gas flow or to the surrounding ground. If 




A numerical study of a fire within the Clyde Tunnel has been conducted. The heat release rate of the 
fire was defined so that the temperatures within the tunnel reached the values described by the RWS 
standard. This study was complemented by heat transfer calculations to establish the impact of a lower 
gap on the temperatures of the structural members behind the protective lining. The following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
 
• To obtain the RWS curve the HRR used has to be established at values which are 
unrealistically high. Given the geometry of the tunnel, ventilation will limit the temperatures 
within the tunnel to values well below the RWS curve. This results in a conservative analysis. 
• The pressure distributions within the tunnel show that pressures close to the gaps are generally 
at or below ambient, thus hot gases will generally not enter through the gap.  
• Specific regions where there is a potential for above ambient pressure near the gap were 
identified. Local peak pressures and temperatures were identified and used to calculate the 
flow of hot gases through the gap. An idealized heat transfer analysis, that includes no losses, 
was conducted. The analysis showed that after 2 hours of fire exposure the temperature of the 
structural elements will reach only 147°C. This analysis can be deemed as very conservative. 
• Given the nature of the imposed fire and the uncertainty of the conditions within the tunnel, a 
simple but very robust and conservative approach was preferred. A more detailed analysis of 
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